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Abstract—Authenticating legitimate nodes is a major concern
of the envisioned vehicular networks. To achieve this, stan-
dards and literature propose to use asymmetric cryptographic
mechanisms which generate significant overheads in terms of
time and power consumption. In this paper, we address this
problem and we propose a novel idea of exploiting physical
layer characteristics to rely on them for re-authenticating future
beacons after verifying the first one cryptographically. Despite
the challenges in such high mobility networks, possible concrete
approaches to start the evaluation of our scheme are presented.
Our approaches are inspired by the vehicular channel related
work conclusions which give signs of future success to our scheme
in this critical field.
I. INTRODUCTION
As pointed out in [1], in contradiction with other networks,
securing vehicular networks at the physical layer has been
disregarded. The reason of this is the nature of such networks
by means of the high mobility of vehicles, which makes
investigating physical layer and exploiting its information for
the sake of security a challenging task. In standards, the
foreseen authentication process states that digital signatures
in addition to certificates have to be generated and attached
to messages by senders. The digital signatures are based
on Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [2]
where each vehicle is equipped with a public and a secret
key; the secret key is used to sign all outgoing messages
while the public key is amended with some other attributes
forming the certificate of the vehicle. Receivers then check
signatures and certificates of messages for correctness and
decide whether they are originated from legitimate senders
or would-be intruders, e.g. roadside attackers.
In order to inform neighbouring vehicles about the current
state, vehicles have to keep sending their states periodically
with a frequency of 1-10 Hz including the position, the speed,
the heading and other similar information in messages called
“beacons”. For each beacon, the procedure for generating
and attaching signatures needs to be executed at the sender
side. In addition, receivers have to keep verifying newly
received beacons even if they are from the same sender.
This whole procedure to ensure that only legitimate vehicles
are able to exchange messages among each others in the
network creates significant overheads due to the complex
cryptographic calculations resulting in major drawbacks that
should be highlighted. The following gives a summary of these
shortcomings::
• The decrease of bandwidth utilization due to the increase
in message size that is necessary because of the must-
included signature.
• The increase in packet collisions due to the increase of the
number of packets per message in an already congested
channel.
• The increase in the end-to-end delay because of:
– The increase in the required time to generate signa-
tures.
– The increase of the transmission delay due to the
need for transmitting additional bits.
– The increase in the required time due to the verifi-
cation process of signatures at the receivers.
In this paper, we restrict our concerns to the last issue
that points out the long time needed to verify the ECDSA-
based signatures. We propose the idea of a novel scheme
for re-authenticating the periodic messages, i.e. beacons, in
vehicular networks. By exploiting the unique physical layer
features between a specific sender and a specific receiver, we
aim to eliminate the drawbacks of the classical authentication
mechanisms proposed in the standards of vehicular networks
while maintaining a reasonable degree of security.
We also provide concrete approaches to start the evaluation
of our scheme inspired by the outcome from propagation
studies in realistic vehicular environments which gives signs
of success to our proposed scheme. Moreover, we propose the
idea of multi-factor authentication with the use of subjective-
logic [3].
II. RELATED WORK
The previous authentication process takes place in the
upper layers of the OSI model. Researchers have realized
its drawbacks and pointed them out, for example, [4; 5]. In
order to mitigate them, some researchers [5] suggested to
use hardware secure modules, but equipping vehicles with
sophisticated processing units adds additional cost. Others
suggested to omit signatures and certificates to reduce the
introduced latency in order to achieve reasonable efficiency
for the critical applications [6], but this will lead to insecure
networks where unauthenticated nodes are able to spoof and
inject messages into networks.
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A. Security at the Physical Layer
The previous shortcomings in the upper layers0 security mo-
tivate researchers in other wireless communication networks
to look for other solutions. They suggested to integrate the
physical layer into the authentication process in static and low
mobility networks [7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12].
Mainly, the work in exploiting physical layer features for
the use of security and authentication can be divided into two
classes:
• Class 1: Extracting the secret key from the common
wireless channel between the transmitter and the receiver,
e.g. [9; 10; 11].
• Class 2: Fingerprinting the wireless channel established
between the transmitter and the receiver, e.g. [7; 8; 12].
Both of them are based on the fact that the wireless chan-
nel established between a specific transmitter and a specific
receiver is unique and only known to both of them. The first
class uses the unique channel variation to establish the secret
key. This approach is considered secured such that only the
transmitter and the receiver are able to construct the key.
However, the verification process still has to be applied in
this case, which means that the long verification time still
exists. On the other hand, the second class does not require
any key extraction or verification. It relies on the uniqueness
of the frequency response for each transmitter-receiver pair,
and hence a receiver identifies a transmitter based on the
history it has for that transmitter. This way, the need of
the signature verification process vanishes with its drawbacks
while maintaining a reasonable degree of security.
At 5 GHz, over a span o 10 MHz, with indoor stationary
user terminals, Xiao et al. [7; 8] proposed ways to exploit
spatial variability of the frequency response. They found that
variations are strongly correlated in time while very weakly
correlated in space giving a positive impact on performance
in such a static scenario. In addition, they concluded that
channel time variations can improve performance whereas
frequency correlation degrades it. Their results show that it
is possible to distinguish between legitimate nodes and other
illegitimate nodes based on the corresponding physical layer
characteristics to each one of them.
B. Vehicular Channel Propagation Models
The distinct features of vehicular networks arise from the
nature of the rapidly changing topology due to vehicles0 rapid
movement. This results in a significant uniqueness in the
statistical characteristics of the multipath propagation in V2V
communication compared to other indoor or even cellular com-
munication. The investigation of vehicular channel characteri-
zation is fairly young research topic [13]. It gained researchers0
interest when WAVE initiative and other vehicular applications
raised concerns regarding vehicular communication. Before
2006, V2V channel characteristics were rarely investigated,
e.g. [14] [15]. Since 2006, there has been a lot of research, e.g.
[16; 17; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22; 23; 24], addressing the vehicular
channel propagation models based on measurement campaigns
considering different frequency bands.
One of the earlier works on V2V channel investigation at the
5.9 GHz band is [25], where the Tapped Delay Line (TDL)
approach was used to model the channel. They stated that
these kind of channels are doubly selective, in other words,
they are both time- and frequency-selective channels. Also at
5.9 GHz, Cheng et al. [21] conducted a measurement study on
V2V narrow-band channel; they presented a single- and dual-
slope large-scale path loss model with Nakagami distribution
to describe the small-scale fading. In addition, they introduced
the Speed-Separation (S-S) diagram, which is a new tool for
understanding and estimating Doppler spread and coherence
time.. Kunisch and Pamp did a measurement experiment in
[24] at 5.9 GHz over a span of 20 MHz, in which they
extracted the scattering function which contains information
about Doppler spread and path delays. They also provided a
good explanation of each propagation path scenario.
Other measurement studies were conducted at different
bands. In [16], Karedal et al. were able to track individ-
ual propagation paths at 5.2 GHz. Paier et al. [17] inves-
tigated pathloss, Power Delay Profiles (PDPs), and Delay-
Doppler spectra from a highway measurement over 240 MHz
at 5.2GHz where the transmitter and the receiver vehicles
travelled in opposite direction. Examples of other studies at
different bands are [26] at 5.3 GHz, and [27] at 5.6 GHz.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER-BASED MESSAGE
AUTHENTICATION
A. Requirements
For our scheme to work, physical layer characteristics have
to meet some requirements in order to be able to rely on
them for future verification of beacons without checking the
signatures. Requirements for these characteristics include:
• Stability: The characteristics should show stability over at
least two consecutive beacons. In other words, the time
correlation of this specific physical layer characteristic
should be high enough to ensure its stability within the
reception of two consecutive beacons.
• Uniqueness: to allow discrimination among several trans-
mitters in the vehicular network, the uniqueness of the
physical layer characteristic among them has to be en-
sured. This means that the characteristic the receiver
relies on has to be spatially uncorrelated to be able
to distinguish between several transmitters at different
locations at the same time. However, due to vehicles
movement, this characteristic should allow a degree of
spatial correlation such that the measured value of the
characteristic when vehicle A at location X is correlated
with the measured value when the same vehicle is at loca-
tion X 0. A noteworthy point in this regard is that vehicles
do not move in random paths, but in deterministic tracks
where prediction of movement could be easily employed.
• Measurable: receivers need to be able to observe and
measure the specific characteristics.
• Unspoofable: attackers should not be able to spoof the
characteristics, luring receivers into accepting false mes-
sages.











Fig. 1. Multipath Model
B. The Proposed Scheme
We take a slightly different approach than the classical
fingerprint approach discussed earlier. Our new approach
considers (re)authentication of earlier communication partners
by characteristics of the communication channel. It is based
on the observation that a radio channel between transmitter
and receiver has a characteristic with a unique signature (for
example defined by multi-path propagation, Doppler shifts...),
which is hard for an attacker to guess or manipulate. Hence,
instead of looking at the frequency response, as it may be chal-
lenging in high mobility scenarios, looking at the individual
multipath components and extracting their characteristics will
provide more robustness. Such a case is shown in Figure 1
where each contribution has its own delay, power, phase, and
Doppler shift.
The conducted measurement studies showed that each av-
erage PDP consists of several identifiable contributions and
that they are presented over several consecutive time instants
(typically in order of seconds) [27]. This was the observation
in [26] and [16] as well. Hence, periodic beacons could be
authenticated based on this channel signature. For this purpose,
a first beacon would be authenticated by means of classical
cryptography, establishing an initial trust anchor.
As long as the channel charachteristic remains sufficiently
stable between this and a consecutive beacon, all subsequent
beacons could now be authenticated by the means of their
channel signature associated with the original transmitter.
Costly cryptographic verification processes may potentially be
skipped for some beacons.
The process is exemplified in Figure 2. A transmitter T
sends periodic messages. The first message has to be cryp-
tographically verified in any case in order to produce an
initial trust anchor. Thereafter, messages are only verified
cryptographically if the receiver trust at A or B in the message
being delivered over the same channel falls below a certain
threshold. Receiver A needs to cryptographically verify the
third beacon while beacons 3 and 4 need to be verified for
receiver B0s case.
C. Multi-factor Authentication and Possible Enhancement
Multi-factor Authentication can play a role in the authen-
tication process where the receiver can rely on different
Fig. 2. Physical Layer Based Message Authentication
observations to form his opinion about the received beacon
whether it is originated from a legitimate node or not. In
order to avoid resorting to the cryptographic verification to re-
build the overall confidence in the latter beacons, the receiver
may combine the output from our proposed scheme with
another lightweight authentication mechanism. This requires
a sufficient degree of flexibility of the outputs to be combined
together and allow multi-factor authentication process. Hence,
we here foresee the use of subjective logic to form a holistic
framework for such authentication mechanisms where each
factor (e.g. multipath characteristics, lightweight authentica-
tion mechanism, etc...) gives an opinion about the received
beacon whether it is generated from the same transmitter as the
previously received beacons or not. Subjective logic extends
the classical logic theory by introducing a degree of certainty
to each opinion. It has a wide set of operators allowing the
fusion of individual factor opinions into one opinion taking the
degree of certainty of each output into account. It has been
deployed in VANETs in [28] to form a misbehaviour detection
framework which our proposed scheme could be integrated
into.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the shortcomings of using ECDSA-
based signatures in the envisioned V2V communication to
achieve a proper authentication of the periodic beacons. The
main drawback of such signatures is the long verification time
needed to verify the signature by the receiver. We proposed a
novel idea of integrating physical layer into the authentication
process aiming at eliminating the shortcomings of the upper
layer authentication mechanisms. Inspired by related work in
vehicular channel propagation models outcome, which gives
signs of future success for our scheme, we proposed concrete
approaches to start the evaluation of the proposed scheme, in
addition to proposing possible ways of enhancements includ-
ing multi-factor authentication using subjective logic.
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